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Julia Kristeva’s “New Forms of Revolt” touches on many familiar 
themes from her earlier writings. In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt 
(1996) and Intimate Revolt (1997), she warns that it is no longer clear who 
can revolt and against whom. Today, people struggle to make meaning and 
form social bonds, to create and critique cultural forms. Unlike the age-old 
prohibition, contemporary power cannot be located because it is 
disseminated across manifold disciplinary mechanisms and media 
spectacles. According to Kristeva the “energetic pessimist,” we live in a 
normalizing “power vacuum” in which human beings are reduced to 
“patrimonial individuals,” to owners of genetic or physiological patrimony 
“free at best to channel hop.” In these times, radical inner experience or 
“intimate revolt” is a necessary, if imperiled, mode of resistance. As she puts 
it in “New Forms of Revolt,” 
to escape the technicians shortsighted political governance 
[…] having a programme is not enough. Men and women 
with unique, uncompromisingly questioning inner 
experiences are required, and this is on the condition only 
that they can be re-formative; men and women who know 
how to pass on and share the language of revolt; it is only 
at this cost that it can be innovative.1 
For Kristeva, inner experiences are not optional nor are they wholly 
private. Psychic life can be the site of re-formation only because it is already 
politicized; intimate revolt can be innovative only when it is passed on and 
shared. In this essay, I’d like to reflect on the possibility of a pedagogical 
revolt or a revolt pedagogy, a “new form” of revolt that might be 
transmitted by (and beyond) Kristeva’s many academic readers. There are 
traditions of revolt pedagogy, from Paolo Friere to Peter MacLaren, but 
Kristeva’s emphasis on psychic life and intimate experience is distinctive 
and “new.”2 In “New Forms of Revolt,” she invites but does not specifically 
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address the question, how can educators encourage “uncompromisingly 
questioning inner experiences”?  
Since the mid-1990s, Kristeva has written extensively on spiritual, 
aesthetic, psychoanalytic, and literary languages of revolt, describing 
intimate upheavals spurred by Christian mystical traditions, paintings of 
severed heads, people with disabilities, and writings from Proust to Collete. 
More broadly, though, intimate revolt takes place whenever we are moved 
to retrospective return, when troubled psyches are brought back to the 
constitutive borders and formative conflicts of subjectivity. If developing 
children must rebel in order to enter the symbolic order, abjecting the 
maternal body but also confronting and displacing paternal authority, then 
troubled adults must return to their rebellious pasts in order to renew 
symbolic ties. The goal of intimate revolt is therefore a pedagogical one: to 
offer psychic lessons and to connect with the “uniquely human” ability to 
represent and make meaning. Whether in a gallery or in the pages of a 
stirring text, revolt revisits the process of learning language and coming to 
know oneself and the social world. For example, in her recent book The 
Severed Head: Capital Visions and related Louvre exhibition Visions capitales, 
Kristeva shows how representations of severed heads can yield the rewards 
of revolt—the “singular autonomy of each as well as a renewed link with the 
other.”3  Although morbid, the severed head image invites artists and 
gallery visitors to question and reflect upon loss and separation as 
conditions of subjectivity. The encounter “casts one into indelible confusion 
but it is not impossible to compensate for that separation…by taking control 
[and] by concentrating on one’s ability to represent.”4 In this way, the 
Visions capitales exhibit is a pedagogical as well as an aesthetic experience. 
Before the canvas and in the halls of the Louvre, artists and visitors can to 
grieve formative losses only if they are able to develop and learn from inner 
experience. 
While intimate revolt is educational, it is does not necessarily flourish in 
educational institutions, especially in the United States. In “New Forms of 
Revolt,” Kristeva argues that our “robotizing and spectacular society 
damages the culture of revolt.” Unfortunately, many U.S. universities have 
witnessed and even encouraged this decline as they struggle with 
diminishing state and federal investment in education. Instead of centering 
faculty research and student learning, schools attract student-consumers 
with new facilities and invest resources only where outcomes can be 
measured and marketed.  Rather than nourishing the surprising upheavals 
of thought, they strive to entertain and assess students in equal measure. 
Kristeva gestures to these problems when she cites some hopeful examples 
of intimate revolt. She celebrates academics who choose—riskily— to 
explore values instead of data. She also shares a memory of a “Chilean 
student waving a Spanish translation of my writing on revolt outside his 
institution, which was on strike and displayed a poster that read: ‘University 
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in revolt,’ because of drastic funding cuts to education.”5 On campuses that 
are at once austere and spectacular, revolt most often takes place at the 
margins and with risks— in social protests, creative-value oriented research 
programs, literary or aesthetic endeavors. In fact, the revolt pedagogy of 
Visions capitales was a kind of experiment at institutional margins. The 
exhibit was part of Parti Pris (“Taking Sides” or “Biased Views”), a series at 
the Louvre that featured thematic shows curated by intellectuals who are 
not museum or art professionals. Through these guest curators, Parti Pris 
sought to introduce difference and conflict into a museum overtaken by the 
culture industry and condemned to “authoritarian sermonizing on repetitive 
values”; at the Louvre, “it seemed as if renovating [museum] walls was 
inversely proportionate to renovating its ideas.”6 To encourage intimate 
revolt, Parti Pris forged something that may still be possible at educational 
institutions or their margins—“a critical space. A zone of frankness. A place 
of rupture.”7  
Kristeva is hopeful about the rewards of revolt, but she acknowledges 
the “price of errors and dead ends.” For every zone of frankness, there is 
another compromised in some fashion, if not by the society of the spectacle 
or technical ratiocination then by pseudo-rebellious nihilism. In “New 
Forms of Revolt,” Kristeva argues that contemporary nihilism leads to stasis 
and fixation. The nihilist rejects old values but is “reconciled to the stability 
of new values. And this stability, which is illusory, turns out to be deadly 
and totalitarian.”8 By contrast, the person in revolt twists and turns in 
relentless questioning. Instead of withdrawing into faux-stable values, they 
are surprised and unsettled in ways that reflect the etymology of revolt. 
Where “revolution” has an history of intellectual associations via revolvere 
(to consult, to reread, to tell), revolt veers off—depending on history.”9 The 
French semes connect it to sullying, reversal, detour, cycle, stalling, upheaval, 
recovery, re-assessment. Can these qualities characterize revolts at the 
margins of the university? I think of an installation at my own institution in 
which a stairwell was “hacked” to make an electronic keyboard played by 
one’s feet. With no signage in the area, the music surprises stair-climbers, 
intervening in the bustle of their day and returning them of their capacity to 
create and make music. The hack spurs the kind of self-reflection and self-
questioning associated with revolt, but it is not impervious to the spectacle 
or nihilistic dead ends. Indeed, Kristeva worries whether technology is a 
new dogma or cult whose stable values are illusory. Although she does not 
address digital music or hacking, her concerns resonate in the era of the 
massive online open course (MOOC) and on campuses where the 
humanities “serve” courses for the sciences. Technology can be “deadly and 
totalitarian” but it can also forge “places of rupture.” Technology can 
devalue questioning or distract us from it, or it can pose questions and 
inspire us to ask our own. 
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For Kristeva, the difference lies in loving relationships. From the earliest 
movements of curiosity to the questioning return of intimate revolt, love 
buoys. In “New Forms of Revolt,” she highlights “the need to believe” as an 
early experience of curiosity rooted in the pre-linguistic “oceanic feeling,” 
the period in which the borders between self and other, child and mother, 
are not yet established. This is the “heart of belief […] not in the sense of a 
supposition, but rather that of an unshakeable certainty, a sensorial 
plentitude and ultimate truth.”10 At the end of this period, the child 
separates itself from the mother with the help of the “loving father” who 
loves and is loved by the mother. The love relation allows the child to 
distinguish themselves and to change their stammering into linguistic signs. 
“I believed and therefore I spoke […] Then carried by this faith that lets me 
hear a loving/loved outside, I burst in to questions.”11 For Kristeva, loving 
relations support the child’s turn to language. You can ask questions only if 
you believe in language. “You can know if and only if you believe you 
know.”12 In adulthood, intimate revolt can renew belief, reminding the 
troubled psyche that meaning making is not merely a compensation for loss 
but also a gift, an opening onto the possibility of love and the pleasures of 
social connection. In educational contexts, an emphasis on loving 
relationships may make intimate revolt more likely. Educators can develop 
exercises or activities that associate the capacity to represent with the 
capacity to connect and share. After all, in order to believe in language and 
begin questioning, students must believe that there is an accepting space for 
love, drives, and affect in the site of meaning. Importantly, the rules and 
organization of an institution must be also amenable to loving connection. 
As a counterexample, I think of the “no excuses” pedagogy championed by 
Samuel Casey Carter, The Heritage Foundation and a growing number of K-
12 charter schools in the United States.13 The approach requires teachers to 
set exacting disciplinary standards and then to “sweat the small stuff,” 
punishing students for the smallest transgressions. Since the goal is student 
compliance for the sake of student compliance, order for the sake of order, 
“no excuses” is inconsistent with revolt. Order, whether in a narrowly 
linguistic sense or broadly social sense, is valuable for the sake of love, 
connection and social bonds. An emptied order, alienated from emotions, 
drives, and affects, offers little comfort to despairing psyches and threatens 
psychic space. 
Although Kristeva has written extensively about depressive social 
orders lacking in love, in “New Forms of Revolt” her attention actually 
centers on ideality syndrome, the belief that there exists an absolute 
satisfaction and the delinquency and turmoil that accompanies its 
disappointment. According to Kristeva, adolescents are especially prone to 
ideality but we are “all adolescents when we are enthralled by the 
absolute.”14 Unlike the nihilist, the adolescent believes too fiercely and 
hopes to surpass or even abolish the parental couple.15 In the spiral of 
disillusionment, however, these demands collapse into nihilism yet again. 
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At one point, Kristeva refers to this figure as the “nihilist believer […] 
necessarily nihilist because pathetically idealist.”16 When reality falls short 
of their ideals, they lament: “I have no choice but to be angry and seek 
revenge with them: vandalism is what follows. […] I have no choice but to 
take it out on myself: self-mutilation and self-destructive behavior 
follows.”17 The adolescent lashes out in destructive and self-destructive 
ways because, while they believe, they do not believe in language. On 
Kristeva’s view, psychoanalysis is especially attuned to ideality because of 
its emphasis on attentive listening. If the adolescent has their demands 
recognized and heard, they might begin to “metabolize their need to believe 
through the pleasure that comes with thinking, questioning, and 
analyzing.”18 In listening, the analyst offers a path away from 
disillusionment and disappointment to a space of loving acceptance in 
language. Although educators cannot hope or plan to psychoanalyze their 
students, the practice of loving listening should be centered in pedagogy. 
The phenomenon of the “flipped classroom” is one way to lift student 
voices, but the practice of listening must also be promoted as well, especially 
on the part of professors. In the face of student rebellions, professors tend to 
redouble authority or order in its emptiest forms. Loving listening may be a 
more vulnerable alternative but it is also more likely to achieve the transition 
to thinking, questioning, analyzing.  
Kristeva herself may need to harness the power and vulnerability of 
loving listening when it comes to her account of French “suburban 
troubles.” In her view, unrest at the edges of Paris, Marseilles, and other 
cities reflects not only the “failure of the French model of secularism” and 
the clash of religions but also the upsurge of “radical evil.”19 It is certainly 
true that “the troubles” indict the secularism of Sarkozy’s ban on the veil 
and the Islamophobic policing that the ban has emboldened. However, the 
charge of extreme or radical evil moves too quickly away from listening to 
judgment. Suburban unrest may illustrate that “following familiar 
disintegrations and social failures, certain people—especially adolescents—
succumb to the disease of ideality: they literally explode.”20 But, whether in 
the suburbs or the margins of the university, these are the kind of rebellions 
that require the recognition of loving listening and that promise upheaval, 
detours, twists and turns. If the loving posture of revolt discriminates, 
encouraging the questioning inner experiences of some but not the 
questioning inner experience of others, its rewards are lost—the “singular 
autonomy of each as well as a renewed link with the other.” In “New Forms 
of Revolt,” Kristeva insists that we consider psychic troubles alongside 
social problems, even or especially when those social problems are as 
extreme as the suburbs. Without the lessons of intimate revolt, supported by 
educators but by no means limited to classrooms or campuses, we imperil 
both curiosity and connection. After all, “the need for connection might one 
day initiate another politics […] As Albert Camus said ‘I revolt, therefore we 
are.’ Or rather, ‘I revolt, therefore we are to come.’”21  
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